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EMBRACE THE SEC
Usha R. Rodrigues*
ABSTRACT
Securities law traditionally only permits corporations that have
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
completed an initial public offering (IPO) to sell equity to the general
public—often a long, expensive process. Initial coin offering (ICOs)
emerged in 2013 as a fundraising tool for non-public blockchain-based
companies to raise billions of dollars while circumventing the SEC and
public offering process altogether. But their early success brought the
attention of the SEC, and in 2017 the SEC asserted the right to regulate
ICOs. Since then, U.S. ICO promoters have struggled to avoid the SEC’s
assertion of jurisdiction, contorting their offerings in an effort to avoid
regulation. They have largely failed. This piece argues that government
regulation is a feature, not a bug for ICOs. If ICO entrepreneurs
acknowledge SEC jurisdiction—and if the SEC, for its part, implements
creative mechanisms to protect investors—blockchain businesses can raise
capital from the general public while continuing to serve the underlying
goals of U.S. securities law.
INTRODUCTION
An initial coin offering (ICO) is an offering of specialized crypto tokens,
or “coins,” that operate on a blockchain, with the promise that those tokens
will operate as the medium of exchange on a digital platform that may exist
at the time of offering or be developed in the future.1 The funds raised in the

*
M.E. Kilpatrick Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I thank Joan
Heminway, Dave Hoffman, Don Langevoort, and David Wishnick. Mistakes are my own.
1.
Thomas Bourveau, Emmanuel T. De George, Atif Ellahie & Daniele Macciocchi,
Information Intermediaries in the Crypto-Tokens Market 7-8 (Working Paper 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3193392 [https://perma.cc/P89N-ZVM2].
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ICO are used to continue to develop the blockchain technology. Typically,
entrepreneurs offer their coins in exchange for existing currencies such as
Bitcoin, but they can also be sold for fiat currency, such as U.S. dollars or
British pounds.2
The wild success of early ICOs fueled an entire ecosystem of blockchain
startups eager to build their own blockchain or blockchain-based application
to create value and, in the course of doing so, raise a lot of money from the
general public. In July 2013, MasterCoin (now known as Omni Layer3),
launched what is regarded as the first ICO,4 which raised about $500,000 in
bitcoin.5 Ethereum, an early ICO success story, raised about $18 million in
bitcoin.6 Similar early successes led the way for the ICO explosion that
occurred in 2017.7 ICOs raised about $5.6 billion in 2017,8 through more
than nine hundred sales.9
The ICO acronym may sound like an initial public offering (IPO), but in
reality ICOs are more like anti-IPOs. There are two traditional methods of
raising capital through the sale of securities: 1) to register those securities
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in an IPO, which costs
millions of dollars and takes months to accomplish, and then offer the shares
to the general public; or 2) to find an exemption from registration
requirements that involves selling the shares privately. ICOs thus offered a
radical break from the past—a way to tap general public funding without
the cost and delay of an IPO.

2.
Kennedy K. Luvai, The End of the ICO Gold Rush? The Regulatory Squeeze on Token
Offerings as a Funding Mechanism for Blockchain-Related Ventures, 31 UTAH B. J. 20, 20 (2018).
3.
Laura Shin, Here’s the Man Who Created ICOs and This is the New Token He’s Backing,
FORBES (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/09/21/heres-the-man-whocreated-icos-and-this-is-the-new-token-hes-backing/#3c7ede861183 [https://perma.cc/3HZC-3FS2].
4.
Chance Barnett, Inside the Meteoric Rise of ICOs, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2017, 1:21 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2017/09/23/inside-the-meteoric-rise-of-icos/
[https://perma.cc/4MN5-KNVQ].
5.
Shin, supra note 3.
6.
Philip, Initial Coin Offering: Ethereum, COINSTAKER (Apr. 18, 2017),
https://www.coinstaker.com/initial-coin-offering/ethereum/ [https://perma.cc/N9FA-H2SD].
7.
Barnett, supra note 4.
8.
Oscar Williams-Grut, Only 48% of ICOs Were Successful Last Year — but Startups Still
Managed to Raise $5.6 Billion, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 31, 2018, 1:44 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-raised-icos-2017-tokendata-2017-20181[https://perma.cc/T4FR-WHKZ].
9.
Kai Sedgwick, 46% of Last Year’s ICOs Have Failed Already, BITCOIN NEWS (Feb. 23,
2018), http://news.bitcoin.com/46-last-years-icos-failed-already/ [https://perma.cc/9YC2-65ZA].
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This innovative type of public offering has rapidly evolved without the
blessing of U.S. regulators. Indeed, regulators have proved deeply
suspicious of ICOs, because their early success also attracted fraudsters.10
As this article will describe, the earliest ICOs simply ignored the prospect
of running afoul of securities laws, advising would-be investors to consult
an attorney. After the SEC’s July 2017 report on a blockchain-based
organization called the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (“DAO
Report”),11 which labeled a defunct token a security, ICO issuers turned to
a familiar argument for evading the reach of U.S. securities law: they argued
that their offerings were not securities at all.
As a brief sidebar, the Howey test enunciated by the Supreme Court in
1946 created a powerful catchall category for securities.12 As the next
Section will describe in greater detail, U.S. securities law imposes numerous
restrictions on the purchase and sale of securities. One method of evading
these restrictions is to argue that one is not in fact selling securities, and thus
need not comply with the law. Howey imposed a functional, multi-factor
test that has swept up all manner of unlikely investments (earthworms,13
payphones14) as securities. ICOs are but the latest example of creative
attempts to structure offerings to evade Howey.
After the DAO Report suggested that tokenholders’ voting rights were
part of what made the offering a security, some subsequent ICO promoters
stripped the offerings of governance and ownership features, and
characterized them as mere tokens meant for consumption (so-called utility
tokens or consumption tokens), rather than investment contracts over which
the SEC could legitimately claim jurisdiction under the Howey test.15 By

10.
A Wall Street Journal study of 1,450 ICOs revealed 271 with signs of fraud including
“plagiarized investor documents, promises of guaranteed returns and missing or fake executive teams.”
Shane Shifflett & Coulter Jones, Hundreds of Cryptocurrencies Show Hallmarks of Fraud, WALL
STREET J., May 18, 2018, at A1.
11.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 81207, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 21(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO (2017), https://www.
sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [https://perma.cc/E26H-HXBM].
12.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
13.
Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 1979).
14.
SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004).
15.
James J. Park, When Are Tokens Securities? Some Questions from the Perplexed, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 13, 2019, 4:05 PM),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/12/20/when-are-tokens-securities-some-questions-from-theperplexed/ [https://perma.cc/SV6X-UH4X].
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analogy, imagine a musician who sells tickets to a future concert well in
advance in order to raise money for the venue and cost of production. ICO
issuers have good reason to try to claim the tokens and coins they sell are
not securities: buyers of unregistered securities sold without an exemption
from the Securities Exchange Act of 1933’s registration requirement are
entitled to rescission—that is, a refund of the full purchase price.16
The problem is that Howey’s definition of an investment contract is
capacious. The SEC has made good use of the authority that Howey grants
it, insistently asserting its authority over ICOs and consistently rejecting the
utility token workaround. Regulators and good-faith ICO fundraisers thus
appear to be at an impasse. The SEC is charged with a tripartite mission: to
protect investors; to maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and to
facilitate capital formation.17 Right now, the investor protection mandate is
steering the agency’s policy. From the SEC’s perspective, there have been
too many fraudulent ICOs, and more importantly, the risk of fraud in these
public offerings is considerable. On the other side, good-faith ICO
fundraisers have either twisted their offerings into sub-optimal knots to
avoid issuing “securities,” or are moving offshore. There are two downsides
here. First, the United States is stifling an innovative and less costly
technique to raise capital—one that, what’s more, allows the general public
a crack at investments traditionally reserved only for the wealthy. Second,
by discouraging entrepreneurs interested in following the rules, they are
creating a situation where the only ICO offerings that do go forth are, in
fact, fraudulent.
This article seeks to persuade the blockchain community that what it
really needs to offer the general public is a security. The Howey test is
friend, not foe. Rather than bringing undesirable government regulation,
acknowledging the offering of a security allows the public a chance to
participate in investment gains and take advantage of protective
mechanisms like a vote. A regulated offering, in other words, is far more
attractive to the general public, not only by virtue of the imprimatur of the
SEC, but also because regulation unlocks the possibility of the familiar
protections investors enjoy with equity stock offerings. Ideally, at the same

16.
Securities Exchange Act of 1933 § 12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C § 77l (2012).
17.
The requirement that the SEC consider a rule's effect on capital formation, efficiency, and
competition was not added until 1996. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 24 (1996).
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time, regulators would be open to ways to structure these offerings that
would comport with the goals of securities law—and would acknowledge
that it is worthwhile to think through ways technology can lower the cost of
capital raising and broaden the investment opportunities for average
Americans. This article will describe the problem and outlines a solution—
an escrow—that could provide both investor protection and reassurance to
honest ICO promoters.
I. THE PUBLIC DESIRE FOR SECURITIES, NOT UTILITY TOKENS
Many in the crypto-community have no interest in governmental
regulation of any kind. Indeed, the main attraction of the blockchain for
some is its ability to circumvent governmental influence entirely. We’ve
seen this story before, in the early days of the internet, when John Perry
Barlow and others advocated for a libertarian cyberspace free from
governance by the ruling bodies of the physical world.18 The blockchain
story has so far played out in a similar fashion, with governments inexorably
asserting their sovereignty over the blockchain.19 The aim of this Section is
to convince the community that their efforts to evade SEC regulation by
way of utility tokens are misguided and self-defeating. Before making that
case, let’s examine how we got here.
U.S. securities laws are disclosure-based. Neither the federal nor the state
government purport to guarantee investors that they will make money, or
even not lose money. Instead, the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934
Securities Exchange Act address three basic concerns. The first is the risk
that the sellers of securities are crooks from the outset, looking to take the
money and run.20 The second is the risk that, once the securities have been
sold and are trading on a secondary market, the insiders commit fraud or fail
to disclose an adequate amount of information.21 The third concern is to
foster markets and investment by creating a system of standardized

18.
Andrea Slane, Tales, Techs, and Territories: Private International Law, Globalization, and
the Legal Construction of Borderlessness on the Internet, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 133 (2008).
19.
See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF
A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006).
20.
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 303-04 (1991).
21.
Id.
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disclosure that enables investors to make informed decisions on a level
playing field. Unlike the first two concerns, which focus on risks, this third
consideration focuses on encouraging prosperity of the system.22
The Securities Act has given rise to an elegant mechanism to ensure
against the first concern, fraud in the initial offering: it puts the deep pockets
and reputation of investment banks on the hook.23 Entrepreneurs must
register with the SEC before going public, a lengthy and expensive process
that helps ensure that investors have a sufficient quantity of information
before sale.24 By assigning underwriters and experts with strict liability for
misstatements in a prospectus, subject to a limited due diligence defense,
the securities laws effectively deputize the investment banks conducting an
offering to police the prospectus for fraud.25 As to the second concern, once
public, the securities laws subject public companies to ongoing reporting
requirements of increasingly large magnitude, ensuring that post-IPO
purchasers of securities are kept well informed. These disclosures occur at
regular intervals (supplemented with updates as needed), and follow a
standard formula, ensuring investors can assess risks uniformly.
ICOs have rapidly grown in popularity and viability as a fundraising tool.
In 2016, ICOs raised $240 million.26 In 2017, they raised $5.6 billion.27 In
2018, they raised even more.28 As ICOs have become more common, the
SEC has consistently, and stridently, asserted its authority to regulate them.

22.
See id. Scholars have debated justifications for mandatory disclosure for decades. Some
scholars argue that voluntary disclosure suffices, because sellers have an incentive to disclose
information to prospective buyers. A key justification for mandatory disclosure, in response to this “the
market will provide” argument, is that requiring standardized disclosures makes it easier for investors
to compare offerings, benefiting both sellers and investors. See Colleen Honigsberg, Robert J. Jackson,
Jr., & Yu-Ting Forester Wong, Mandatory Disclosure and Individual Investors: Evidence from the Jobs
Act, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 293, 293 (2015)
23.
See Merritt B. Fox, Regulating Public Offerings of Truly New Securities: First Principles,
66 DUKE L.J. 673, 688-89 (2016) (discussing market mechanisms that have arisen to cure information
asymmetries in IPOs, namely investment bank intermediation).
24.
Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U.
ILL. L. REV. 217, 225.
25.
Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1636 (2010).
26.
Williams-Grut, supra note 8.
27.
Id.
28.
How much more is a subject of some debate. See Justina Lee, How Much Have ICOs Raised
in 2018? Depends on Who You Ask, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 4, 2018, 6:00 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-05/how-much-have-token-sales-raised-in-2018depends-on-who-you-ask [https://perma.cc/QYK5-6AGN].
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While some ICOs simply defy U.S. regulators, many others are trying to
evade its reach. This Part will first describe those evasive efforts, and then
make the case for an approach that concedes the SEC’s jurisdiction and
works within the established framework for U.S. securities.
II. ICO ATTEMPTS TO EVADE SEC REGULATION
Currently, most ICOs are launched by an organization or group of
developers.29 Some are traditional business entities or nonprofits.30 Others,
like the 2016 DAO, are not formally organized at all.31 In the absence of
affirmative guidance or regulation, no two ICOs look exactly alike; the
design of an ICO is determined solely by the team behind a certain
blockchain project.32 They have taken various paths with regard to securities
laws. Some have openly flouted the SEC—and the SEC has taken an
increasingly active role in actions against them.33 Others have tried to evade
the reach of U.S. securities laws in three ways. First, some ICOs have tried
to bar would-be investors from the United States from participating, in the

29.
Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and
the Democratization of Public Capital Markets 18 (Cardozo L. Stud. Res. Paper No. 527, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3048104.
30.
See, e.g., Michael del Castillo, SEC Files ‘Emergency’ Restraining Order Against $1.7
(Oct.
13,
2019,
3:45
PM),
Billion
Telegram
ICO,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2019/10/11/sec-files-emergency-restraining-orderagainst-17-billion-telegram-ico/#171bdc0e29cb [https://perma.cc/HY55-SEPW]; Joseph Maurice, Top
7 ICOs for Non-Profits to Watch in 2018, DISRUPTOR DAILY (Oct. 13, 2019, 3:55 PM),
https://www.disruptordaily.com/top-7-biggest-icos-for-non-profits-to-watch-in-2018/
[https://perma.cc/HK7V-9R7V].
31.
Zug, a small canton in Switzerland, has been home to a disproportionate number of ICOs,
leading to its unofficial title of “Crypto Valley.” Ralph Atkins, Switzerland Embraces Cryptocurrency
Culture, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c2098ef6-ff84-11e7-96509c0ad2d7c5b5 [https://perma.cc/YDC5-NBY8].
32.
Ameer Rosic, What is an Initial Coin Offering? Raising Millions in Seconds, BLOCKGEEKS
(2017), https://blockgeeks.com /guides/initial-coin-offering/ [https://perma.cc/8TAK-WYCJ].
33.
See, e.g., SEC v. PlexCorps, No. 1:17-cv-07007, 2017 WL 6398722 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14,
2017) (granting a preliminary order and asset freeze against Dominic LaCroix and his owned entities for
likely violation of securities laws); Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Exposes Two Initial Coin
Offerings Purportedly Backed by Real Estate and Diamonds (Release No. 2017-185, Sept. 19, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-185-0 [https://perma.cc/2WY2-EKY6] (“The Securities
and Exchange Commission today charged a businessman and two companies with defrauding investors
in a pair of so-called initial coin offerings (ICOs) purportedly backed by investments in real estate and
diamonds.”).
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hopes that they will qualify as foreign offerings under Regulation S.34
Second, some ICOs have offered utility tokens, arguing that they do not
qualify as securities under the Howey test.35 Third, promoters have directed
offerings not to the general public, but instead only to accredited investors,
the wealthy individuals who qualify to invest in private securities. 36 This
section will describe each workaround in turn. First, though, a more
detailed description of Howey is in order.
The Howey test defines the catchall “investment contract” category of
securities requiring registration under the Securities Act in the absence of
an exemption from it. There are three main elements.37 First, Howey
requires that the investment be “solely from the efforts of others.”38 Courts
have not interpreted “solely” literally, but instead have inquired as to
whether “the efforts made by those other than the investor are the
undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect
the failure or success of the enterprise.”39 Second, Howey requires that there
be an expectation of profit, which the Court defined as (1) capital
appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment or (2)
participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors’ funds.”40 Third,
an investment contract requires a “common enterprise.”41 The nuances of
the Howey test could consume this entire article, but these basics suffice to
orient the reader. The point is that securities law casts a broad net, reaching

34.
Lukas Hofer, Why Token Issuers Exclude U.S. Investors, ICO.LI (Oct. 13, 2019, 4:00 PM),
https://www.ico.li/us-investors/ [https://perma.cc/UG36-GLH6]; see Offshore Offers and Sales, 63 Fed.
Reg. 9632 (Feb. 25, 1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 and 249).
35.
Park, supra note 15.
36.
See Randolph A. Robinson III, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of
Initial Coin Offerings, 85 TENN. L. REV. 897, 925 (2018).
37.
An additional element, only rarely at issue, requires that money be invested.
38.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
39.
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973).
40.
United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
41.
Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. Courts agree that horizontal commonality, which looks at the
relationships between an individual investor and the pool of other investors, meets the Howey test, but
are less clear on whether the relationship between the investor and the promoter is enough to satisfy the
common enterprise element. See, e.g., SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2001); Teague v. Bakker,
35 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1994); Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81 (2nd Cir. 1994); Curran v. Merrill
Lynch, 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council Inc., 561 F. 2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977);
Wasnowic v. Chi. Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aff’d without majority, 491 F.2d
752 (3rd Cir. 1973). But see, e.g., SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2002); SEC v.
Eurobond Exch. Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334 (9th Cir. 1994); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary Inc., 497 F. 2d 473
(5th Cir. 1974).
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just about every likely investment scheme. ICO entrepreneurs have spent
countless hours and dollars trying to evade the reach of Howey, and thus of
the SEC and U.S securities law. Of course, the easiest way to avoid U.S.
regulation is not to sell to U.S. citizens at all.
III. BARRING U.S. CITIZENS FROM PURCHASING TOKENS
First, some ICOs have tried to bar would-be U.S. investors from
participating in the offering, in the hopes that they will qualify as foreign
offerings under Regulation S.42 These offerings use technological
mechanisms to help keep U.S. investors out. To ensure that U.S. investors
are not participating, some coin offerors have started blocking U.S.-based
IP addresses and requiring investors to show their passports.43 Startups are
also using other measures to ensure that U.S.-based investors do not

42.
Andrew Henderson, 5 Reasons Every Crypto Investor Needs a Second Residency and Second
CAPITALIST
(Oct.
13,
2019,
4:30
PM),
Passport,
NOMAD
https://nomadcapitalist.com/2018/04/06/reasons-crypto-investor-needs-second-residency-secondpassport/ [https://perma.cc/8MAA-AC79]. For example, although EOS maintains that its tokens are not
securities, it has banned U.S. investors because of state regulations and blue-sky laws. Evelyn Cheng,
This Hot Digital Currency Trend Is Minting Millions, But US Investors Aren't Allowed to Play, CNBC
(July 18, 2017, 12:07 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/18/hot-digital-currency-trend-mintingmillions-off-limits-to-us-investors.html [https://perma.cc/V5EZ-WYRH].
43.
Henderson, supra note 42. For example, four ICOs, iOlite, Celsius, ShoCard and Auctus will
require investors to show their passports in order to screen-out U.S. investors, with iOlite and Celsius
also blocking U.S.-based IP addresses for added protection. Initial coin offerings are no longer using
clickwrap to screen out U.S.-based investors. The Monaco Visa ICO employed a clickwrap block so
U.S. investors would not join. Clickwrap agreements require the user to click a link before proceeding.
Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and Browsewraps: How
the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 17; DanaEdwards, ICOs Are Not for US Citizens? Should ICOs Reject Self-Proclaimed US Citizens as a Way to
Reduce Legal and Regulatory Risk?, STEEMIT (2017), https://steemit.com/icos/@dana-edwards/icosare-not-for-us-citizens-should-icos-reject-self-proclaimed-us-citizens-as-a-way-to-reduce-legal-andregulatory-risk [https://perma.cc/WN7Y-BBNL]. The Cobinhood ICO also banned U.S. investors. See
TERMS
AND
CONDITIONS
6.1
http://www.cobinCOBINHOOD
hood.com/assets/terms/COBINHOOD_terms_n_conditions.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6RD-4CL7] (“The
Website, the Platform and COB Tokens are not publicly offered for use to natural and legal persons,
having their habitual residence or their seat of incorporation in the following countries: i) Canada; ii)
People’s Republic of China; iii) the United States; iv) Taiwan; and v); and countries listed on OFAC
sanctions lists (‘Restricted Areas’)”). The belief among the crypto community is that this is not enough
to stop the SEC from coming after coin issuers. Anna Irrera & Michelle Price, Cryptocurrency Issuers
Clean Up, Shun U.S. Investors as SEC Gets Tough, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2018, 2:17 PM)
http://ca.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idCAKBN1GX2OX-OCATC [https://perma.cc/HSD2A3SK].
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participate in their ICOs, including enlisting “brokers and platforms that
perform know-your-customer and anti-money-laundering due diligence to
verify the identification and residency of interested investors.”44 These
efforts are not foolproof45—for example, investors can use virtual private
networks (VPNs) to mask their IP addresses46—but the efforts do enough to
gesture towards compliance and at least potentially assuage regulators’
concerns.47
IV. OFFERINGS TO U.S. PURCHASERS
THAT ARE NOT “SECURITIES”—UTILITY TOKENS
Not all ICO offerings have attempted to evade the reach of U.S. securities
law by moving overseas. There has been a concerted effort to develop
public token offerings that are not considered securities offerings under the
Howey test. These token offerings are “utility tokens” or “app coins,” that
is, tokens to be used for consumptive purposes, and whose primary purpose
is not to be held for future profit.48 Utility tokens are more like a right to
buy a future product or service than a right to participate in the profits of a
future enterprise. For example, Golem is a blockchain company that allows
individuals to rent out their computer processing power on demand, similar

44.
Andrew Ramonas, No U.S. Investors Need Apply for Some Digital Coin Offerings,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.bna.com/no-us-investors-n73014463997/.
45.
See id. (“‘We cannot be sure that every new upcoming transaction is outside the U.S.,’ chief
executive officer Ingus Staltmanis told Bloomberg BNA in an emailed statement.”).
46.
See Max Eddy, What Is a VPN and Why You Need One, PC MAG (Oct. 13, 2019, 4:45 PM),
https://www.pcmag.com/article/352757/you-need-a-vpn-and-heres-why
[https://perma.cc/MN65NU9T] (discussing how VPNs function to “mask[] your identity and location”).
47.
See William Suberg, Bancor Seeks to Exclude US Users From Trading Over Regulatory
Uncertainty, Cointelegraph (June 19, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/bancor-seeks-to-excludeus-users-from-trading-over-regulatory-uncertainty [https://perma.cc/BUG2-9HXN].
48.
Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, Angela Moon, & Heekyong Yang, Global Cryptocurrency
Crackdown Sparks Search For Safe Havens, WESTLAW J. COMPUT. & INTERNET, Dec. 15, 2017, at 9,
2017 WL 6452835 at *2 (“Many U.S. startups thought they could avoid such scrutiny by selling ‘utility
tokens,’ which gave buyers access to products or services rather than a stake in the company.”); see also
Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the
Democratization of Public Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 463, 493 (2019) (“Because [utility]
tokens entitle the holder to use, consume, or access an online service or serve other functional purposes
(for example, participating on a messaging platform or surfing the Internet without ads), elements of a
consumption purpose are present.”).
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to how Airbnb allows short-term lodging rental on demand.49 These
transactions take place using GNT, a token that can also be traded on other
exchanges. While some individuals are buying and selling GNT for the
purpose of using it to purchase processing power, the token at one point rose
to a high 116 times its initial offering price.50 It is unlikely that increased
demand for the service itself caused the bulk of that increase.51
Professor Randolph Robinson likens utility tokens to “pre-paid coupons
that will unlock value in yet to be built software programs or platforms.”52
If you find this explanation of a utility token somewhat confusing, there is
good reason. Buying a utility token in an initial offering generally doesn’t
make financial sense. Nevertheless, many of these utility token offerings
have had a speculative component—either because investors are betting that
their use rights will go up in value, or because they do not understand that
they are not receiving an equity interest in the offering.
The market trend of reconfiguring tokens from equity offerings into socalled consumptive goods faces two problems: 1) in general the public is
buying tokens or coins not to use them, but as an investment, and 2) the SEC
has reiterated that utility tokens are in fact securities, and therefore subject
to regulation.
The first problem with utility tokens is that they are disingenuous at best.
A member of the general public participates in an ICO because she wants to
make money.53 Yet utility tokens are by design not what Jonathan Rohr and

49.
Steve Buchko, What is Golem (GNT)? A Complete Guide to the Decentralized
Supercomputer, COIN CENTRAL (Dec. 7, 2018), http://coincentral.com/golem-gnt-beginners-guide/
[https://perma.cc/KA5X-N3PD].
50.
Cali Haan, Alleged Price Calculation Errors at Tether Badly Skew Crypto Price Data on
INSIDER
(Aug.
6,
2018,
8:07
PM),
CoinMarketCap,
CROWDFUND
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2018/08/137412-alleged-price-calculation-errors-at-tether-badlyskews-crypto-price-data-on-coinmarketcap/ [https://perma.cc/X734-QMW8].
51.
As a second example, the STORJ ICO sold tokens to users that enable them to buy or rent
cloud storage space and bandwidth. It raised $30 million in its ICO. Matthew May, What to Consider
in
an
ICO,
FORBES
(Nov.
21,
2017,
9:00
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2017/11/21/what-to-consider-in-anico/#9f2e6285c449 [https://perma.cc/XAB2-MEQT]. Max Middelman, Why Utility Tokens Will Not
Make You Rich, MISSION STUDIOS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://medium.com/the-mission/why-utility-tokenswill-not-make-you-rich-646312723104 [https://perma.cc/23W7-P4EC].
52.
Robinson, supra note 36.
53.
Anna Irrera, Steve Stecklow, & Brenna Hughes Neghaiwi, Special Report: Backroom Battle
Imperils $230 Million Cryptocurrency Venture, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2017, 6:06 PM),
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Aaron Wright term investment tokens, which “bestow express economic
rights on their holders.”54 The utility token buyer “invests” in a service that
she likely has little interest in actually using. Indeed, a year after its
successful ICO, Digipulse is destroying all of its tokens because hardly any
were being used.55 Its CEO, Normunds Kvilis, blogged that out of 320 signups in the previous six days, “only two people have actually used the DGPT
token for its main purpose. This indicates that the token is generally used
to pursue quick gains from a speculative standpoint, rather than being used
for its main purpose of service use.”56 In short, ICO entrepreneurs, in an
effort to avoid the reach of securities laws entirely, have created offerings
of dubious value that lack the traditional investor protections the securities
laws afford. No wonder the SEC is worried.
The net effect of these two problems is that consumptive tokens are
suboptimal digital assets which their promoters stripped of key investor
protections like voting rights, in a futile effort to avoid regulation.
V. NONPROFITS: THE SWISS FOUNDATION MODEL
Several prominent ICOs have blended the first two approaches and
launched overseas nonprofits to avoid the reach of U.S. securities laws.
Tezos, Bancor, and Ethereum57 organized via nonprofits in Switzerland to
evade the reach of U.S. securities law and the law of other jurisdictions.58

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoin-funding-tezos-specialreport/special-report-backroom-battleimperils-230-million-cryptocurrency-venture-idUSKBN1CN35K [https://perma.cc/8HW8-6RRG].
54.
See Rohr & Wright, supra note 29, at 52. Rohr and Wright have offered an insightful and
helpful framework for guiding the SEC in weighing which of these offerings should qualify as securities.
55.
Sam Town, Engineered Destruction: One Year Post-ICO, This Startup is Destroying All
(Aug.
7,
2018),
Issued
Tokens
Due
to
Market
Speculation,
CRYPTOSLATE
https://cryptoslate.com/engineered-destruction-one-year-post-ico-this-startup-is-destroying-all-issuedtokens-due-to-market-speculation/ [https://perma.cc/443Y-SW6R].
56.
Normunds Kvilis, Digipulse — Past, Present and, Future, DIGIPULSE (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://blog.digipulse.io/digipulse-past-present-and-future-5cb6e9c6455c.
57.
Brenna Hughes Neghaiwi, Top Swiss Cryptocurrency Lawyer Questions 'Stupid' ICO
Structure, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2018, 9:13 AM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-swiss-crypto/top-swisscryptocurrency-lawyer-questions-stupid-ico-structure-idUKKBN1FB1TM
[https://perma.cc/Z7TL8G35].
58.
Atkins, supra note 31 (“Of the 10 biggest proposed initial coin offerings—by which startups raise funds by selling tokens—four have used Switzerland as a base . . . .”).
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Early Swiss ICOs such as Tezos formed nonprofit foundations that offered
tokens not for sale, but instead in exchange for nonprofit “donations.”59
For example, Tezos’ offering documents called the contributions “a nonrefundable donation” and not a “speculative investment.”60 The theory is
that if Tezos tokenholders truly donated money to a foundation, then the
tokens were not securities under the Howey test. These evasions may not
be successful—the promoters were defendants in two class-action lawsuits
seeking rescission and damages, claiming that they sold unregistered
securities in the U.S.61
Notably, Facebook’s new Libra Association, a consortium of powerful
for-profit companies including Visa Inc., Mastercard Inc., PayPal Holdings
Inc. and Uber Technologies Inc., is organized as a Swiss nonprofit. 62 Libra
Association plans to launch a cryptocurrency whose value is tied to
government-issued currencies,63 but these plans have spurred considerable
governmental attention and resistance.64

59.
Irrera, Stecklow, & Neghaiwi, supra note 53. Tezos founder Kathleen Breitman once likened
Tezos tokens to a tote bag you’d receive in return for a donation to a public TV station. Gideon LewisKraus, Inside the Crypto World’s Biggest Scandal, WIRED (June 19, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/tezos-blockchain-love-story-horrorstory/?mbid=social_twitter&__twitter impression=true [https://perma.cc/D38R-RSB5].
60.
Irrera, Stecklow, & Neghaiwi, supra note 53.
61.
Anna Irrera & Steve Stecklow, Tezos Organizers Hit with Second Lawsuit Over
Cryptocurrency Fundraiser, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2017, 5:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usbitcoin-tezos/tezos-organizers-hit-with-second-lawsuit-over-cryptocurrency-fundraiseridUSKBN1DF37L?il=0 [https://perma.cc/37ZP-4E8R].
62.
Kate Rooney, The Fed is Looking into Facebook’s Libra Cryptocurrency as Powell Flags
‘Serious Concerns’, CNBC (July 10, 2019, 2:10 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/10/powell-saysfacebooks-libra-cryptocurrency-raises-serious-concerns-such-as-money-laundering.html
LIBRA
ASS’N,
https://libra.org/en-US/association/
[https://perma.cc/N5YK-GMRW];
THE
[https://perma.cc/KCB4-U532] (“The Libra Association is an independent, not-for-profit membership
organization, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland.”).
63.
AnnaMaria Andriotis, Peter Rudegeair & Liz Hoffman, Facebook’s New Cryptocurrency,
Libra, Gets Big Backers, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebooks-newcryptocurrency-gets-big-backers-11560463312 [https://perma.cc/QER7-69NZ].
64.
Ryan Browne, Here’s Why Regulators Are So Worried About Facebook’s Digital Currency,
CNBC (Oct. 13, 2019, 4:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/19/heres-why-regulators-are-soworried-about-facebooks-digital-currency.html [https://perma.cc/LGM5-VXCK]; David Concannon,
Yvette D. Valdez & Stephen P. Wink, The Yellow Brick Road for Consumer Tokens: The Path to SEC
and CFTC Compliance, in GLI - BLOCKCHAIN & CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATION 101 (Josias Dewey
ed., 2019), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/yellow-brick-road-for-consumer-tokens-path-tosec-cftc-compliance [https://perma.cc/9ZL3-KKWG].
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VI. SAFTS
Finally, some promoters have directed offerings not to the general public,
but instead only to accredited investors, the wealthy individuals who qualify
to invest in private securities.65 The SAFT (simple agreement for future
tokens) suggests that one way to avoid liability under the securities laws is
to offer the investment opportunity exclusively to accredited investors, who
are more sophisticated and better prepared to accept the risk.66 In other
words, the SAFT promoters acknowledge that SAFTs are investment
contracts subject to the 1933 Act, but argue that they qualify for exemption
from registration because they are offered only to accredited investors.67
SAFT investors fund developers who “develop [a] genuinely functional
network, with genuinely functional utility tokens, and then deliver those
tokens to the investors. The investors may then resell the tokens to the
public, presumably for a profit, and so may the developers.”68 The tokens
themselves are merely “consumptive products,”69 and thus not subject to the
reach of U.S. securities law. Thus, accredited investors get in early in the
investment phase of the SAFT. The general public buys tokens at a point
when they have only consumptive value. The downside of this method is

65.
Usha Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679, 725 (2019).
66.
Juan Batiz-Benet, Marco Santori & Jesse Clayburgh, The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant
Token Sale Framework, SAFT PROJECT, 19 (Oct. 2, 2017), https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-ProjectWhitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKN2-RBWW]. The SAFT is modeled on the SAFE, the simple
agreement for future equity. The SAFE is a contract in a fledgling corporation that provides that an
investor’s interest will convert automatically into equity if the company raises finances in the future, is
sold, or goes public. Joseph M. Green & John F. Coyle, Crowdfunding and the Not-So-Safe Safe, 102
V A.
L.
REV.
ONLINE
168,
172
(2016),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/crowdfunding-and-not-so-safe-safe
[https://perma.cc/XA4M-52E4]. SAFEs were created to offer a simple solution to the problem that often
confronts early-stage entrepreneurs who needed to raise funds quickly and cheaply, without the timeand cost-intensive negotiations that surround venture financing and, increasingly, angel investing. Id.
67.
Batiz-Benet et al., supra note 66, at 4.
68.
Id. at 1.
69.
Id. Several platforms have used the SAFT framework, including Unikrn, a sports betting
platform backed by Mark Cuban, and Kik, which raised $100 million in Ethereum to develop a new
social internet platform.
See Form D, Securities and Exchange Commission,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1625681/000162568115000002/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.
xml [https://perma.cc/7YVR-DRRK]; Eugene Kim, Crypto Start-Ups are Trying to get Their House in
Order Ahead of a Possible SEC Crackdown, CNBC (Oct. 12, 2017, 12:16 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/12/crypto-start-ups-turn-to-safts-for-ico
s-raising-more-than350m.html [https://perma.cc/SX4H-L54Z].
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that it perpetuates the-haves-versus-the-have-nots divide because only
accredited investors can obtain equity under the SAFT model.
VII. THIS ISN’T WORKING
Regulators and blockchain enthusiasts are at an impasse. Entrepreneurs
want to create and sell tokens without any regulation, and the SEC wants to
tamp down ICOs because of the risk of fraud. To overcome that impasse,
each will need to face hard truths. For the SEC, that hard truth is that the
genie is out of the bottle. Blockchain technology is agovernmental. Bitcoin,
itself a manifestation of the distrust in global financial institutions that
emerged from the 2008 financial crisis, represents a fundamental challenge
to governmental power as manifest in fiat currency. The pressure on the
SEC’s role as securities gatekeeper is intense. For a while, at least, ICOs
unlocked the power to raise funds from the general public to finance
innovation. Elizabeth Pollman and Jordan Barry elaborate on what they call
“regulatory entrepreneurship,” a model where startups like Uber “move fast
and break things,” relying on consumer pressure to force local regulators to
accommodate their business models.70 Early ICO offerings likewise refused
to wait for the securities law’s blessing. Recent ICOs have not been able to
harness public sentiment in their favor, however, because utility tokens are
not as widespread as Uber or Airbnb.71 And the SEC has made clear that it
views most token offerings as securities. The choking effect of the SEC’s
actions, coupled with the anti-regulatory ethos of blockchain, spells
frustration, stalled capital raising, and hostility for regulators from the ICO
community.72
For their part, ICO enthusiasts need to understand the SEC’s perspective.
For decades, the SEC has labored to protect the general public from the hype
of risky offerings, worried that grandma will lose her savings to

70.
Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383,
446 (2017).
71.
See Ankit Kumar, Hand in Glove: Start-ups and ICOs in 2019, TECHPLUTO (May 20, 2019),
https://www.techpluto.com/hand-in-glove-start-ups-and-icos-in-2019/
[https://perma.cc/NCP3YUHZ].
72.
Evelyn Cheng, The SEC Just Made It Clearer That Securities Laws Apply to Most
Cryptocurrencies
and
Exchanges
Trading
Them,
CNBC
(Mar.
7,
2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/07/the-sec-made-it-clearer-that-securities-laws-apply-tocryptocurrencies.html [https://perma.cc/5K5E-2HFS].
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unscrupulous promoters. The SEC has targeted extremely troubling
offerings. To give some examples: AriseBank claimed to be the world’s
first decentralized bank and began raising money through an ICO sale of its
own cryptocurrency, AriseCoin, in November 2017.73 AriseBank made
numerous false claims and advertisements, as well as misled investors,74
promising that the coin would appreciate.75
Or take PlexCorps, which raised about $15 million from thousands of
investors through an ICO selling “PlexCoins,”76 and promised investors that
they would receive a return of 1,324% in twenty-nine days. 77 The SEC
alleged that PlexCoin had virtually no one working on the project, that
proceeds were being used to fund its officers’ home decor projects, that it
repeatedly misled investors about the value of the coin, and that it was an
unregistered security trading on cryptocurrency exchanges.78
Finally, the SEC alleged that REcoin Group Foundation, LLC,79 and one
of its officers, Maksim Zaslavskiy, fraudulently misled hundreds of
investors in violation of securities law, raising $300,000. 80 The SEC alleges
that they made false representations about private investments they had thus
far,81 including that investors could expect a return of 10-15%.82 Yet
REcoin never assigned any coins to investors.83 On November 15, 2018,
Zaslavskiy pleaded guilty to federal criminal charges in the Eastern District
of New York.84

73.
Complaint at 1, SEC v. AriseBanks, No. 3:18-cv-00186 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2018).
74.
The complaint alleges that AriseBank never possessed any of the purported technology or
assets, for example, the complaint asserts that AriseBank falsely claims that it purchased a 100-year old
bank and its association with an AriseBank branded visa card. See id. at 2.
75.
Id.
76.
Complaint at 1, SEC v. PlexCorps, No. 1:17-cv-7007, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2016145
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2017).
77.
Id. at 2.
78.
Id. at 1, 3.
79.
Complaint at 1, SEC v. RECoin Grp. Found., LLC, No. 1:17-cv-05725, (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
2017).
80.
Id. at 2.
81.
Defendants claimed that they had raised $2 million, and later $4 million, when none had
actually been raised. Id.
82.
Id. at 3.
83.
Id.
84.
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. of N.Y., Brooklyn Businessman Pleads Guilty
to Defrauding Investors Through Two Initial Coin Offerings (Nov. 15, 2018) (on file at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/brooklyn-businessman-pleads-guilty-defrauding-investorsthrough-two-initial-coin [https://perma.cc/BC22-6TU3]).
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There are signs that these three examples are merely the tip of the iceberg.
A Wall Street Journal examination of offering documents from 1,450 ICOs
found 271 with major red flags.85 These red flags included documents
copied from earlier offerings, promises of guaranteed returns, and even
missing or fake executive teams.86 The case of Denaro, described in the Wall
Street Journal article, illustrates the grave fraud risks crypto offerings can
pose for investors:
“Jeremy Boker” is listed as a co-founder of Denaro, an
online-payment project. In investor documents for a public
offering in March, which claimed to have raised $8.3
million, Mr. Boker boasted of his cryptocurrency startup’s
“powerhouse” team. In his biography, he noted a
“respectable history of happy clients” in consulting before
he launched Denaro.
In fact, Mr. Boker’s bio image was a stock photo, there
is no evidence he exists and the rest of his team appears to
be fictional, except for two freelancers who said they were
paid by people unknown to them to market the project.87
These examples highlight the problems the SEC confronts. The
spectacular success of early ICOs fed the enthusiasm of a host of blockchain
entrepreneurs.88 But it also attracted unscrupulous individuals intent only
on making a quick buck through fraud.89 The SEC is charged with
protecting the investing public, and thus is understandably worried about
these fraudsters.90 Right now, it can see no clear way to separate genuine
offerings from fraudulent ones and is using the U.S. securities laws to tamp
down the whole ICO market because of the rampant risks it presents.
The second problem is that the SEC has rejected all the creative attempts
to evade Howey’s reach. SEC Chair Jay Clayton stated in December 2017,
“Merely calling a token a ‘utility’ token or structuring it to provide some

85.
Shifflett & Jones, supra note 10.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
89.
Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff, & David Wishnick, Coin-Operated
Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 594 (2019).
90.
See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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utility does not prevent the token from being a security.”91 Clayton further
noted that offerings that “emphasize the potential for profits based on the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others to contain the hallmarks of a
security under U.S. law.”92 At an SEC town hall, Clayton said: “Much of
what I have seen in the ICO . . . space, is a security offering . . . I don’t
know how much more clear I can be about it.”93 In a subsequent U.S. Senate
hearing, he indeed was clearer, stating: “I believe every ICO I’ve seen is a
security.”94
The solution is simple: blockchain entrepreneurs should accept that they
are offering securities, and work with regulators to come up with investor
safeguards in the offering itself. This suggestion will raise the hackles of
the cryptoanarchist set, who entertain visions of a blockchain free from
government regulation of any kind. But the history of internet regulation
teaches us that governments inevitably will assert jurisdiction over the new
spaces technology creates.95 Better to be part of the regulatory framework
than resisting completely and having regulation thrust upon the blockchain
without input from the community.
VIII. REGULATION ISN’T PERDITION, IT’S SALVATION
Conceding that token offerings are securities would likely strengthen
ICOs immeasurably. There’s always been a wink and a nod accompanying
utility token offerings. Their claims that the offerings are solely for

91.
Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statementclayton-2017-12-11 [https://perma.cc/E47W-ZGPU].
92.
Id.
93.
Jack Mathis, ICOs are Securities, ‘Don’t Know How Much More Clear I Can Be’: SEC
Chairman, CCN (June 14, 2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.ccn.com/icos-are-securites-dont-know-howmuch-more-clear-i-can-be-sec-chairman/ [https://perma.cc/FSY4-9ZTS]. The SEC has already said that
payment tokens like Bitcoin and Ether are not securities. Jonathan Shieber, SEC Says Ether Isn’t a
Security, but Tokens Based on Ether Can Be, TECHCRUNCH (June 14, 2018),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/14/sec-says-ether-isnt-a-security-but-tokens-based-on-ether-can-be/
[https://perma.cc/5SJD-CC7C]. The SEC has acknowledged that cryptocurrencies themselves may not
be securities. For example, Bill Hinman, Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance, while
comparing Ether to Bitcoin, stated that “current offers and sales of Ether are not securities transactions.”
94.
Stan Higgins, SEC Chief Clayton: ‘Every ICO I’ve Seen Is a Security’, COINDESK (Feb. 6,
2018),
https://www.coindesk.com/sec-chief-clayton-every-ico-ive-seen-security
[https://perma.cc/JF7W-F7ML].
95.
See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 19.
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consumptive use ring hollow. In general, people want to buy these token
offerings to trade them, to speculate on their future value.96 If they were
truly for consumptive value, developers could code nontransferability into
the blockchain. If tokens could not be transferred, there could be no
possibility of a secondary market. Currently, they do not.97
A fundamental contradiction exists at the core of the utility token concept:
scarcity determines value for assets, but for tokens or units of exchange to
have value, people must be willing to spend them. A classic, if homely,
example is the babysitting cooperative that existed on Capitol Hill in the
1970s. Staffers created a kind of barter economy, where they would babysit
in exchange for “scrip” that could be redeemed for babysitting services
later.98 A “crisis” of sorts arose because the scrip became scarce, and people
began to hoard, valuing the promise of future nights out over actually using
the currency.99 Put simply, if everyone is buying tokens as speculative
investments rather than to use them, then fewer people will actually use the
service. As the network effects spiral downward with fewer and fewer
users, the service itself will cease to be viable.
Summing up, here’s where we are. Blockchain offerors contorted their
offerings into utility tokens to avoid being labeled as securities. This
“solution” is unsustainable for two reasons. First, the SEC has rejected the
argument.100 Second, it’s keeping the general public from an equity interest
in these exciting offerings. At best, with the SAFT offerings, accredited
investors receive the benefits of investment, while the have-nots remain on
the outside.101
I offer a radically different approach. Rather than trying to dream up
increasingly contorted coin offerings that evade the Howey test, the cleanest

96.
Bill Carmody, The Top Initial Coin Offerings to Watch in 2018, INC. (Nov. 17, 2017),
http://www.inc.com/bill-carmody/top-10-initial-coin-offerings-icos-to-watch-heading-into-2018.html
[https://perma.cc/84TC-NU28].
97.
See FENNIE WANG, PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI, ALEXIS COLLOMB & KLARA SOK, FINANCING
OPEN BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEMS: TOWARD COMPLIANCE AND INNOVATION IN INITIAL COIN
OFFERINGS
34-35
(2019),
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02046793/document
[https://perma.cc/S9SX-EBR3] (describing why, despite its feasibility, the option of encoding
nontransferability into the blockchain is “unlikely to be . . . actually applied in practice”).
98.
Joan Sweeney & Richard J. Sweeney, Monetary Theory and the Great Capitol Hill Baby
Sitting Co-op, 9 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 86, 87 (1977).
99.
Id. at 87.
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move would be to acknowledge that any investment tokens and any
offerings of utility or consumptive tokens that cannot be exercised right
away (that is, those redeemable only for a service yet to be built) are all
securities. Indeed, I would go farther and label functional utility tokens as
securities as well. As I have already described, utility tokens are suboptimal
offerings whose sole raison d’etre is to avoid the Howey test.102 As I argue
below, calling token offerings “securities” offers more benefits than costs,
and makes utility tokens practically obsolete. The downside, from the
promoter’s perspective, is this move would cede SEC power to regulate.
That’s not much of a downside, considering that U.S. ICOs are basically in
a state of paralysis now, trapped in regulatory limbo.
More importantly, conceding tokens’ status as securities would empower
entrepreneurs to conduct offerings that look more like traditional offerings,
giving voting rights and distribution rights to the public in a way that some
communities are already experimenting with.103 Crucially, it would give
the public what it wants: a real chance to invest in this innovative technology
in a manner previously only available to the wealthy. Ultimately,
government regulation is a path to standardized disclosure that allows
blockchain entrepreneurs to access the general public. And that’s where the
money is.
IX. THE PATH FORWARD
The SEC staff have issued a “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’
Analysis of Digital Assets” to help analyze whether a digital asset qualifies
as a security.104 But this framework merely clarifies the application of the
law—it does not attempt to flex to adapt securities law to blockchain
technology. The SEC’s immediate concern with ICO is fraud. These
traditional protection mechanisms are not, however, the only mechanisms
available to address the problems of offering and post-offering fraud. This

102. See supra Section II.A.2.
103. See DAOSTACK, WHITE PAPER V1.1 2 (Apr. 22, 2018), https://daostack.io/wp/DAOstackWhite-Paper-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3HL-28AC].
104. Bill Hinman & Valerie Szczepanik, Statement on “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’
Analysis of Digital Assets,” SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/statement-framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets [https://perma.cc/6WWGSHS7].
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section gestures (but no more than gestures) toward a path for U.S. securities
offerings on the blockchain.
There are mechanisms that could assuage the SEC’s concerns, grant
entrepreneurs access to new sources of capital, and allow the general public
to participate as investors in early stage blockchain ventures. In another
work,105 I identify venture capital financial contracting mechanisms—some
of which ICOs already employ—that could make crowdfunding viable. I
will here suggest that tailoring some already common mechanisms—such
as an escrow—may enable them to meet the SEC’s concerns.
To appreciate how an escrow might work, it helps to start with the
fundamental problems each new venture seeking outside investors faces.
Two are disadvantages a potential investor has vis-à-vis the entrepreneur.
Investors face an information asymmetry—entrepreneurs will always paint
the venture’s prospects in glowing terms, and investors do not know
whether to believe rosy projections or treat them as mere puffery.106
Similarly, investors risk agency costs—the danger that the entrepreneur will
shirk or slack, and fail to do the work needed to make the project a
success.107 Finally, both parties suffer from uncertainty—neither investor
nor entrepreneur knows what the future holds.
The escrow is a mechanism for addressing these problems. Put simply,
an escrow involves a trusted third party (a bank or similar agent) that holds
funds for a period of time and allows payouts only upon the fulfillment of
certain pre-arranged conditions.108
Currently, some ICO promoters implement an escrow to address a
specific concern. ICOs often include in the blockchain code a vesting
schedule, tying up their tokens so they cannot be sold at once.109 This
feature does offer investors some protection—otherwise an unscrupulous

105. Usha Rodrigues, Financial Contracting with the Crowd (U. Ga. Sch. of Law Research Paper
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(forthcoming
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[https://perma.cc/MHR6-JT2K].
106. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076-77 (2003).
107. See generally Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 57 (1989).
108. Justin
Pritchard,
What
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Escrow?,
BALANCE
(Apr.
19,
2019),
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-escrow-315826 [https://perma.cc/A7R6-ZLPR].
109. Rodrigues, supra note 105, at 42.
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promoter could sell the public tokens on the promise of building a network,
and then immediately sell their own tokens and exit stage right without ever
having built the platform. The self-imposed vesting schedule protects
against that risk of a quick scam—if the promoter must wait to sell her
tokens for a period of months or even years, then she has to work to make
the network viable. Otherwise her tokens will be worthless by the time she
can sell them.
ICO promoters could, using this same principle, create a real-life escrow
for the funds raised at a financial institution. They could articulate key
milestones in the development of their project, and tie funding to the
achievement of these milestones. They could, in short, accomplish via
escrow the staged financing common in the venture capital world. With
their funds securely housed in escrow, the company would not face the risk
of running out of funding (as long as it made good on its promises). At the
same time, investors would reduce agency costs, uncertainty, and
information asymmetry by delaying some payouts until the company had
met its milestone requirements.
Staged financing is but one example of how an escrow, coupled with the
voting rights made possible when the tokens sold in an ICO are
acknowledged to be securities, can protect investors and empower
entrepreneurs. This simple concept of an escrow is a powerful one. By
allowing for funds to be securely amassed, but not dispersed, it can
simultaneously reassure the entrepreneur that funds are available, while at
the same time leaving the investors with some strings to pull.
While there is much more to say on these topics, the goal of this piece is
not to offer detailed solutions. Instead, this piece has meant chiefly to
articulate the problem ICOs now present, and to suggest that both the
regulator and the regulated need to acknowledge the perspective of the other
side. On the part of ICO promoters, that truth is that circumventing
securities regulation is a losing game, one not worth playing. Regulation
offers legitimacy and the prospect of larger capital markets. On the part of
the SEC, the hard truth is that ICOs represent a persistent hunger for easier
ways to access capital than the status quo—and that creative investor
mechanisms may be readily implemented to respond that need. The best
way forward is regulation that fosters markets precisely because it protects
investors from fraud, while allowing the general public the chance to invest
in private markets.
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